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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE LAND BOARD 
Appella;n.t 
-vs.-





BRIEF OF APPELLANT' 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Utah's 1959 legislature authorized investment of not 
to exceed 50% of the Permanent School Fund moneys in 
corporate securities meeting statutory standards of qual-
ity (Section 65-1-65, U. C. A. 1953 as amended 1959). Re-
spondent refused to issue checks for the purchase of 
authorized securities on the ground that the purchase of 
corporate securities was unconstitutional. 
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This is an action commenced under the Utah Declar-
atory Judgment Act. Appellant sought a declaration 
from the lower court as to its rights and authority under 
Section 65-1-65 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 1959, in view 
of the provisions of Section 31, Article VI and Section 7, 
Article X of the Utah Constitution. It was the judgment 
of the lower court that the statute in question violated 
Section 31, Article VI and was invalid to the extent it 
permitted investment of school funds in corporate securi-
ties. No declaration was made as to the effect of Section 
7, Article X on plaintiff's investment activity, and the 
only issue before this court on this appeal is the propriety 
of the lower court's construction of Section 31, Article VI, 
which reads as follows : 
''Sec. 31 (Lending public credit forbidden) 
The Legislature shall not authorize the State, 
or any city, county, town, township, district or 
other political subdivision of the State to lend its 
credit or subscribe to stock or bonds in aid of any 
railroad, telegraph or other private individual or 
corporate enterprise or undertaking.'' 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
TI-IE PURCHASE OF CORPORATE SECURI-
TIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATUTE IS 
NOT A LENDING OF THE PUBLIC CREDIT 
IN AID OF THE CORPORATION WHOSE SE-
CURITIES ARE PURCHASED. 
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PoiNT II 
THE PURCHASE OF CORPORATE SECURI-
TIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATUTE 
IS NOT A SUBSCRIPTION TO STOCK OR 
BONDS IN AID OF A CORPORATE ENTER-
PRISE OR UNDERTAKING. 
PoiNT III 
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS MUST BE 
SUSTAINED UNLESS CLEARLY IN VIOLA-
TION OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
THE PURCI-IASE OF CORPORATE SECURI-
TIES IN ACCORDANCE WITI-I STATUTE IS 
NOT A LENDING OF THE PUBLIC CREDIT 
IN AID OF THE CORPORATION WHOSE SE-
CURITIES ARE PURCHASED. 
The principal proscription of Section 31, as indicated 
by the title, is against lending the public credit. This is 
a common kind of constitutional provision which has had 
frequent judicial scrutiny. Corpus Juris Secundum treats 
the generic provision at page 1167 of Volume 81. Begin-
ning on page 1168, the editors say: 
"In order to constitute a violation of the constitu-
tional provision, it is essential that there be an im-
position of liability directly or indirectly on the 
state, and unless the credit or faith of the state is 
obligated there is no violation. The giving or lend-
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ing of credit of the state prohibited by the Consti-
tution occurs only when such giving or lending re-
sults in creation by the state of a legally enforce-
able obligation on its part to pay one person an 
obligation incurred or to be incurred in favor of 
that person by another person.'' 
In Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce, 121 
Colo. 521, 218 P. 2d 498, therefore, the Colorado court held 
that a statute authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds 
did not pledge or lend the state's credit because there 
could be no call by the bondholders upon the general funds 
of the state. In Commissioners of Bladen County v. 
Boring, 95 SE 43, on the other hand, a statute authorizing 
the County to guarantee road bonds of townships within 
the County was lield, by the North Carolina Court, to 
violate a constitutional provision prohibiting counties 
from lending their credit. 
It is clear from the texts and cases that a loan of 
the state's credit can only occur when the state enters into 
such a relationship that it must pay another's debt if he 
does not. The purchase of corporate securities does 
not create a relationship of the proscribed kind. The 
owner of a corporate bond or stock certificate has no obli-
gation to the creditors of the issuing corporation by vir-
tue of that ownership. A bondholder is himself a pre-
ferred creditor. A stockholder has some claim upon the 
assets of the corporation (Fletcher Cyclopedia of Cor-
porations, § 8224) and no personal responsibility to its 
creditors (Section 16-2-13 U.C.A. 1953; 18 C.J.S. 1306). 
Even if it could be contended that Appellant's pur-
chase of corporate securities somehow lent the public 
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credit, such purchases would still be proper and constitu-
tional unless they were also "in aid of" the corporation. 
The Virginia Court had occasion to discuss the meaning 
of a provision similar to Utah's in Holston Corporation v. 
Wise County, 131 Va. 142, 109 S.E. 180. In that case, the 
county entered into a contract with a corporat'ion by 
which the corporation agreed to furnish gravel at a speci-
fied price to any contractor building county roads, and 
the county guaranteed payment. The Court said such 
a contract did not grant the credit of the county ''in aid 
of" the contractors unless the contractors could not have 
obtained gravel on their own cr~dit or made a greater 
profit by getting a reduced price because of the pledge 
of the county credit. Many cases have held that whether 
or not an action which might lend public credit was in aid 
of a private individual depends on the animating pur-
pose of the public officials. (See annotation which ap-
pears at 87 ALR 168) The purpose of purchases made 
in accordance with Section 65-1-65 would be to improve 
the investment position of the Permanent School Fund, 
not to aid corporations. 
The question of whether a purchase of corporate 
bonds offended the ''credit clause'' was squarely before 
the Virginia Court in .Almond v. Day, 197 V a. 792, 91 S.E. 
2d 667. It held a statute authorizing the purchase of 
corporate securities was constitutional and did not offend 
the credit clause of the Virginia Constitution. In par-
ticular the court said, beginning at page 667 : 
"Use of the State's funds for purchase of se-
curities for the State's benefit is not an extension 
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of "credit" which poses any threat to the finan. 
cial security or welfare of the State. Extending 
its credit to aid and promote private enterprise 
was the evil from which the State had suffered 
financially. The potential danger incurred in 
lending credit to foster and promote the interests 
of those who had no rightful claim, in justice or in 
morals, to the State's help or relief was the evil to 
be arrested. When the underlying and activating 
purpose of the transaction and the financial obli· 
gation incurred are for the State's benefit, there 
is no lending of its credit though it may have ex-
pended its funds or incurred an obligation that 
benefits another. Merely because the State incurs 
an indebtedness or expends its funds for its benefit 
and others may incidentally profit thereby does 
not bring the transaction within the letter or the 
spirit of the 'credit clause' prohibition.'' 
POINT II 
THE PURCHASE OF CORPORATE SECURI-
TIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATUTE 
IS NOT A SUBSCRIPTION TO STOCK OR 
BONDS IN AID OF A CORPORATE ENTER-
PRISE OR UNDERTAKING. 
The constitutional language which concerns us here 
is that which forbids authorization ''to subscribe to stock 
or bonds in aid of'' any corporate enterprise. If the 
phrase "to subscribe to" is synonymous with the verb "to 
purchase,'' a clear conflict between constitution and 
statute must be recognized where, but only where, a pur-
chase is attempted the activating purpose of which is 
to "aid" a corporation. It is the appellant's conten-
tion that subscription is different from purchase and 
that the framers of the constitution were concerned about 
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a kind of evil which could proceed from subscription and 
not from the kind of purchase authorized by Sec. 65-1-65. 
Reference to the standard legal texts and dictionaries 
clearly marks for us a distinction between'' subscribe to'' 
and ''purchase.'' Fletcher ( 4 Fletcher Cyclopedia Cor-
porations 1372) devotes some seven pages to the distinc-
tion. It is certain that a subscription can only relate to 
an original issue of stock and a direct transaction with 
the issuing corporation or other subscribers. 
In Guara;nty Mortgage Co. v. Wilcox, (218 P. 133; 
62 U. 184) this Court noted the distinction between sub-
scription and purchase and expressed the point of view 
was undoubtedly in the minds of the constitutional drafts-
men. The following language of the Pennsylvania Court 
was cited with approval: 
"It seems to us that there is a clear distinction 
between a subscription agreement and a contract 
for the purchase of stock. Subscribers, as generally 
understood, are those who, upon the formation of 
a corporation, agree mutually to take and pay for 
the shares of the capital stock.'' 
Appellant could not, acting under the authority of 
Section 65-1-65, enter into a subscription agreement be-
cause only securities of corporations having a five-year 
dividend record can be purchased. 
That some real difference between subscription and 
purchase was recognized by the members of the constitu-
tional convention is evident from the record of the con-
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vention proceedings. 1 At page 894 of Volume I of Pro-
ceedings Constitutional Convention, there begins the rec-
ord of a long and heated debate on the proposal of Mr. 
Roberts that the following section be added to the con-
stitution's legislative article: 
"Neither the State of Utah nor any political 
subdivision thereof shall become a stockholder in 
or loan its credit to nor make any appropriation 
for the benefit of any person, company, associa-
tion or corporation unless two-thirds of the quali-
fied voters at a regular election to be held shall 
assent thereto.'' 
It is obvious from the debate that this proposal rep-
resented the extreme limitation sought to he imposed upon 
the legislature by members of the convention. Those who 
believed the legislature should be permitted to exercise its 
judgment in this area were at least as vocal and unques-
tionably more numerous since the proposal of Mr. Rob-
erts was defeated (p. 928) and a motion for reconsidera-
tion failed (page 1002, Vol. II). 
The further records of the convention do not include 
discussion of the language which became Section 31 of 
Article VI. It is significant, however, that Mr. Roberts' 
proposal forbidding the State to "become a stockholder" 
was rejected and a provision was accepted which pro-
hibited only subscriptions to stock and bonds of private 
corporations. The conclusion is inescapable that. there 
was something about subscription not inherent in" becom-
ing a stockholder'' which the convention found repulsive. 
--
1 Proceedings of constitutional convention may be resorted to in 
aid of construction and interpretation of constitutional provision 
(Cooper v. Utah Light & Ry. Co., 35 U 570, 102 P 202). 
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There can be no question that the real issue in the 
convention was whether or not the public credit should 
be lent. Mr. Roberts, the proposer of the section, seemed 
to claim no other objective for his proposal than the 
avoidance of any pledge of the public credit, and the sec-
tion heading would confine the scope of the prohibition 
to action which would pledge the public credit.2 
1895, the year of the convention, was in the era of 
frantic railroad construction.3 It had been the practice 
of the United States and some states to offer bounties, in 
the form of land or money, to railroad companies for road 
construction or to guarantee the payment of their debts. 
Tennessee in particular had suffered severe losses, and 
the Tennessee situation was pointed out, in the course of 
the convention debate, as the evil to be avoided. The 
activity which resulted in heavy public debt in Tennessee 
is summarized in the 1926 edition of ''Moody's Govern-
ments'' beginning at page 1878. The historical summary 
begins: 
''Aid to companies in the construction of public 
improvements was responsible for a large part of 
the debt of Tennessee. 'An act to establish a sys-
tem of internal improvements in this State' was 
passed Feb.11, 1852 and provided that State bonds 
to the extent of $8,000.00 per mile might be issued 
and lent to turnpike and railroad companies-" 
* * * * ''Before and immediately after the war 
--
2 
"In case of ambiguity in a statute, the title and headings may 
be resorted to as an aid in the ascertainment of the legislative intent." 
(82 C. J. S. 731, Statutes § 350) 
3 
"Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, the courts will 
take into consideration all the facts and circumstances existing at 
t!Ie time of, leading up to its enactment, such as the history of the 
times, contemporary customs, the state of the existing law, the evils to 
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$27,678,000 state bonds were lent to railroad 
companies.'' 
The evil seen by our convention lay in the lending of 
credit to private corporations in this manner where the 
state became obliged to pay the debt which was incurred 
for and was the primary obligation of the railroad 
companies. 
There is a distinct kinship between a pledging of the 
public credit in aid of a private corporation and a promise 
by government to purchase shares of such a corporation 
when organized. In both cases, the action of the govern-
ment is promotional; the promise is given to induce in-
vestors to commit their money to an enterprise thought to 
be in the public interest. In both cases, the promise is or 
may be enforceable at the suit of the investors or the 
creditors of the corporation. The motivation, the risk and 
the mechanics are entirely different where corporate 
securities are acquired with accumulated funds as a part 
of an investment program calculated to increase the yield 
from public funds and protect them from the depreciating 
effects of economic inflation. 
The constitutional convention was concerned that the 
Legislature should not engage in promotional activities of 
the kind specifically prohibited, that is - lending the 
public credit or entering into subscription contracts. That 
the state might become a stockholder in the course of a 
planned investment program was not distasteful to the 
members. They were opposed to the state's underwriting 
enterprises in the nature of utility expansion by new 
10 
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corporations without experience or solid financial foun-
dation whether the underwriting was done by direct 
guarantee or pre-incorporation subscription. 
It is in this light that the court should construe the 
language of Article VI, Section 31. There is abundant 
logic and authority to support the view that investment 
in well-established corporate securities with public funds 
accumulated only for investment was never intended to 
be prohibited. Such investment is in aid of the State, 
not the corporation. 
PoiNT III 
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS MUST BE 
SUSTAINED UNLESS CLEARLY IN VIOLA-
TION OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW. 
The Court is undoubtedly aware of the principle of 
constitutional law that the judicial effort should be to 
sustain legislation, not to condemn it. The principle should 
apply with special force where, as in this case, the legis-
lation passed both houses without one dissenting vote. 
This Court has been among the most eloquent in endorsing 
the principle. In Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 U 237, 48 P 2d 
526, it said: 
"in approaching the subject we have in mind 
the rule that when an act of the Legislature is at-
tacked on grounds of unconstitutionality the ques-
tion presented is not whether it is possible to con-
demn the act, but whether it is possible to uphold 
it. The presumption is always in favor of validity, 
and legislative enactments must be sustained un-
less clearly in violation of fundamental law. * * * * 
11 
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Every presumption will be indulged in favor of 
legislation and only clear and demonstrable usur-
pation of power will authorize judicial interference 
with legislative action.'' 
To sustain the statute here in question, this Court 
need only recognize the well-established distinction be-
tween subscription and other kinds of securities purchase 
contracts, construe the ''credit clause'' as it has been 
construed by other courts and understood by the writers, 
or acknowledge that only activity primarily intended to 
aid corporations is prohibited. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons: 
1. Security purchases do not lend the public credit. 
2. Security purchases authorized by Section 
65-1-65 cannot be subscriptions. 
3. Activity contemplated by Section 65-1-65 can-
not be presumed to be ''in aid of'' corporations 
rather than the state. 
appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the judgment of the District Court herein and declare 
Section 65-1-65 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 1959, to be con-
stitutional, valid and operative. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN J. ALLEN 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellant 
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